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AMERICA, Plaintiff-Respondent, 
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COLOl\IBINE COAL COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, LAURA S. MONAY, 
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Administrator of the Estate of Frank 
V. Colombo, deceased, CARBON 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
STATE LA\V, NOT FEDERAL LA\\T, CON-
TROLS IN DETERMINING THE EFFECT OF 
THE ACCEPTANCE OF PAY~IENT OF IN-
TEREST AND PRINCIPAL INSTALLMENTS 
AFTER NOTICE OF DEFAULT. 
The central question to the determination of this 
appeal is not whether the Government had authority to 
apply the proceeds of the insurance policy differently 
than the Government did, nor whether the servicing of 
SBA loans is a discretionary function. The question on 
appeal is whether the acceptance of interest and prin-
cipal installments by the Government constituted an 
abandonment and waiver of the notice of acceleration 
and default which rendered subsequent foreclosure pro-
ceedings void. 
The question of the effect of the Government's ac-
tion in accepting payments after notice of default and 
acceleration upon a foreclosure suit in the Third District 
Court of Utah brought under Utah statutory foreclosure 
law is a question of Utah state law and procedure. The 
Government chose the forum in this case. The Govern· 
ment cannot now be heard to complain because Utah 
state law is applied. l\ioreover, as this brief will more 
fully develop, under case law precedent, Utah law is 
controlling. The cases cited by the Government and, 
more importantly, a case decided by the United States 
Supreme Court which was overlooked by the Govern· 
2 
ment's Brief, hold that state law controls on issues such 
as are here presented. 
The cases cited in the Government's Brief under 
Point II beginning at page 10, do not apply to the issue 
before the Court. All of the cases cited by the Govern-
ment are federal cases, brought in federal court, under 
federal law, proceeding under federal statutory author-
ity. The choice-of-law question in all of the cases cited 
by the Government was whether, under the vagaries of 
the Erie Doctrine, the federal court had to apply the law 
of the state in which it was sitting. Erie R. Co. v. Thomp-
kins, ( 1938) 304 U.S. 64, 82 L.Ed. 1188. What all of 
the cases cited by the Government ultimately held was 
that in certain defined areas, such as government con-
tracts or securities, a federal court did not have to adopt 
a state rule as the rule of decision in a federal case. Of 
course, the Erie Doctrine problems do not arise in state 
courts. There is no corollary of the Erie Doctrine which 
applies to state courts and there could not be, for the 
reasoning behind requiring federal courts to follow state 
law would make no sense if the state courts themselves 
were not allowed to follow state law. In order to achieve 
uniformity among federal courts on certain narrow ques-
tions, the federal courts have carved out a narrow ex-
ception to the general rule. The cases cited by the Gov-
ernment are a fairly exhaustive representation of this 
exception. Yet, even under federal precedent, the rule 
urged by the Government is too narrow in its scope to be 
applied here. On page 14 of the Government's Brief, for 
instance, the Government quotes from Cassidy Commis-
3 
sion Company v. United States (10th Cir. 1967), 387 
F.2d 875, in support of the Government's position. A 
comparison of the quotation with the text of the original, , 
however, reveals that the case does not argue for so ab-
solute a rule. On page 878 of the Tenth Circuit opinion 
we find that interposed between the second and third 
sentences of the Government's quote is the following 
sentence: 
~n. the absence of an applicable act of Congress, 
It Is the duty of the federal courts to fashion a 
federal rule governing the rights of the United 
States under such security instruments as the 
chattle mortgage here involved. 387 F'.2d at 878. 
The meaning of the quoted passage is considerably 
changed by the addition of the omitted sentence. What 
the Tenth Circuit was talking about was the right of 
federal courts, under certain circumstances, to adopt 
their own federal rule of decision. This is a far cry from 1 
saying that a state supreme court must abandon its own 
law and adopt as a rule of decision the policy guidelines 
of a federal agency. 
Similarly, the passage quoted in the Government's ' 
Brief from United States v. Sommerville (3rd Cir. 
1964), 324 F.2d 718 (Government's Brief, p. 14) takes 
on new meaning when read in context. The quoted pas· 
sage ends in a footnote which explains: 
Two separate inquiries must be made. The fir~t 
is to ascertain if the requisite federal interest IS 
present. If there is, .a federal rule may be formu· 
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lated. The necessity of uniformity must decide 
whether a state la~ should be rejected as the 
source for the applicable federal rule. 324 F.2d 
at 715, n. 8. 
And what is the "requisite federal interest" which 
would allow a federal court to ignore the state rule? The 
answer, the Company submits, has been fully presented 
by the United States Supreme Court in a case which 
demonstrates quite clearly that the requisite federal in-
terest would not be present in the instant case. A federal 
court, it would seem, presented with this identical appeal, 
would adopt the Utah rule. 
In the case of United States v. Y azell ( 1966), 382 
U.S. 341, 15 L.Ed.2d 404, 86 S.Ct. 500, the United 
States Supreme Court was presented with a case involv-
ing, as does the instant case, the collection by the Gov-
ernment of a Small Business Administration loan. The 
SBA had granted a disaster loan to a husband and wife 
in Texas, taking a note secured by a chattle mortgage 
accompanied by the wife's separate acknowledgment re-
quired by the Texas law of coverture. At that time, 
Texas law provided that a wife could not bind her sepa-
rate property unless she had first obtained a court decree 
removing her disability to contract. In the United States 
suit on the note the federal district court sustained the 
' 
wife's plea of coverture. The Fifth Circuit and the 
United States Supreme Court affirmed even though the 
Supreme Court expressed dislike for the state doctrine. 
Many of the same arguments were urged by the Gov-
ernment in Yazell as are presented by the Government 
5 
in ~his case. All such arguments were rejected by the 
Umted States Supreme Court, which held, inter aUa: 
Clearly, in the case of these SBA loans there is no 
"federal interest" which justifies invading the 
peculiarly local jurisdiction of these States in 
disregard of their laws, and of the subtleties' re-
flected by the differences in the laws of the vari-
ous States which generally reflect important and 
carefully evolved state arrangements designed to 
serve multiple purposes. 15 L.Ed.2d at 411. 
The Court quoted with approval a case in point in-
volving California law: 
The Ninth Circuit, in Bumb v. United States, 
276 F.2d 729 (CA 9th Cir.), aptly observed in 
response to a claim by the Small Business Admin-
istration that the 'need for uniformity' excused it 
from complying with a California 'bulk sales' 
statute requiring notice of intent to mortgage: 
"It is true that the Small Business Administra· 
tion operates throughout the United States, but 
such fact raises no presumption of the desirability 
of a uniform federal rule with respect to the va· 
lidity of chattle mortgages in pursuance of the 
lending program of the Small Business Admin· 
istration. The largeness of the business of the 
Small Business Administration offers no excuse 
for failure to comply with reasonable require· 
ments of local law .... It must be assumed that the 
Small Business Administration maintains com· 
petent personnel fa~ili~r with the la~s of the 
various states in which 1t conducts ~usmess, and
1 who are advised of the steps reqmred by loca 
law in order to acquire a valid security interest 
within the various states." 1.5 L.Ed.2d at 407, n. 
13, quoting 276 F.2d at 738. 
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The Court pointed out that the Small Business Ad-
ministration's Financial Assistance Manual, SBA-500, 
"is replete with admonitions to follow state law careful-
ly," 15 L.Ed.2d at 413, n. 35, and repeatedly emphasized 
that the loan, like most SBA loans, was a specially de-
signed transaction not in need of "uniformity rule" pro-
tection. 
Again, it must be emphasized that this was a 
custom-made, hand-tailored, specifically negoti-
ated transaction. It was not a nation-wide act of 
the Federal Government, emanating in a single 
form from a single source. 15 L.Ed.2d at 408. 
And on this point the Court distinguished Clearfield 
Trust Company v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 87 L. 
Ed. 838, 63 S.Ct. 573, which is relied upon by the Gov-
ernment in the instant case. Id. (see Government's Brief, 
p. 12). The other previous United States cases on the 
subject were also distinguished on the point that they in-
volved general plans or programs, not individual con-
tracts, and explained on this basis the "necessity of uni-
formity" doctrine. 
The decisions of this Court do not compel or em-
brace the result sought by the Government. None 
of the cases in which this Court has devised and 
applied a federal pri~cipal ~f. law superce?in~ 
state law involved an issue ansmg from an md1-
vidually negotiated contract. ... 
The Court's decisions applying 'federal law' to 
supercede state law typic~lly relate to programs 
and actions which by their nature are and ~ust 
be uniform in character throughout the nation . 
. . . 15 L.Ed.2d at 411. 
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On the other hand, in the type of case most 
closely resembling the present problem state law 
has invariably been observed .... 15 L.Ed. at 412 
: .. There is here no need for uniformity. Ther~ 
is no problem in complying with the state law· in 
fact, SB~ transactions in each state are specific. 
ally and m great detail adapted to state law. 
There is in this case no defensible reason to over-
ride state law .... 15 L.Ed.2d 413. 
In the instant case there is also no defensible reason 
to override state law. All of the reasons advanced by the 
United States Supreme Court for following state law in c 
Yazell apply to this case also. This case, as did Y azell, c 
involves the collection by the Government of an indi· 
vidually negotiated SBA administered loan. If this case 
were in federal court Yazell would control and Utah 
state law would have to be applied by the federal court. 
But unlike Y azell and all the cases cited in the Govern-
ment' s Brief, this case was brought, by the Government, ' E 
in state court. By this fact alone, irrespective of the 
compelling Y azell precedent, the Government subjected 
itself in this case to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts 
and the rule of Utah law. For it is the general rule that a 
the United States, by coming into state court as a party c 
plaintiff seeking affirmative relief, accepts the status of 
an ordinary litigant with no special privileges. See 91 a 
C.J.S., United States §§ 175, 183, 197; 54 Am.Jur., n 
United States § 116; and the cases cited therein, c.f., · 
The Southern Cross, (2d Cir. 1941), 120 F.2d 466 at ~ 
468. 
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) 
) 
VS ) Case No. 12459 
) 
COLOMBINE COAL COMPANY, ET AL.) 
ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS, COLOMBINE COAL COMPANY, ET AL. 
Defendants-Appellants respectfully 
cite for the consideration of this Court the case 
' of Walker Bank & Trust Company v. Neilson, 490 
P.2d 328 (Utah, 1971), which was decided after 
1 the briefs in this case had been filed. 
The proposition to which the Walker 
Bank v. Neilson case applies is: 
That where money has been made avail-
able to pay the amount due on a mortgage prior to 
or about the same time as the notice of 
acceleration, and where a tender was made and 
money paid into court at the foreclosure 
proceedings, it is proper to deny foreclosure. 
9 
CONCLUSION 
According to the Utah case law precedent cited in 
the Appellant's Brief, the notice of acceleration was 
waived and vacated, because the Government accepted 
payment of interest and principal installments after giv-
ing notice of acceleration, and all subsequent proceed-
ings in the foreclosure were void and taken in error. 
Utah law, not federal law, is controlling on this point. 
The Government must start its foreclosure proceedings 
oYer if it wants to foreclose the $300,000 loan. The pres-
ent order of sale, based upon the combined foreclosure of 
both notes, is invalid, and must be set aside. It is re-
spectfully submitted that this case should be remanded 
to the trial court for determination of the correct 
amounts due and the effect of the Company's tender in 
light of the smaller amount due. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Donald B. Holbrook, Esq. 
Edward J. McDonough, Esq. of 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK 
&McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
800 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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